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Executive Summary
In recent years, worldwide terrorist strategy has changed from long term plan-
ning and high impact attacks, to relatively short-term planning, ’marauding’
attacks. In other words, terrorist attacks from 2010 to present have often
consisted of a small number of terrorists in densely populated public spaces
actively searching out people to maim and kill with weapons that are har-
der to regulate, such as knives and vehicles, with little regard for their own
survival. This begs the question, therefore, of how we mitigate against these
’marauding terrorists’. If we assume 3 different types of actors: Public, Ter-
rorists, and Responders, and assume the strategy of the Terrorists is to kill
as many people as possible before they themselves are killed, how can the
strategies of the Public and Responders (police, bouncers etc.) be optimised
to minimise loss of life?
In this report, the problem at hand and important information are compiled
before 3 approaches to model a terrorist attack in a public space are considered
- a Particle Model, a Discrete Network Model, and a Game Simulation model.
Whilst this is by no means a complete list of possible models of a terrorist
attack, these were believed to be models that could be developed the most in
a week at the ESGI130 at the University of Warwick. For each model type,
we first consider their assumptions and suitability to the problem, then model
the scenario. Finally, we consider possible extensions to each model, and also
how they may be used to evaluate the most effective strategies of the Public
and Responders given the information available to them at any one time.
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1 Problem Statement
1.1 Outline
This decade, ’marauding terrorist’ attacks, where a small group of terrorists move around
a public space with weapons such as knives, guns, and vehicles, have been on the rise.
Given the small amount of planning needed to perform these attacks, except for acquiring
the weapon of choice and determining the location, it is very hard to prevent such attacks,
and therefore the focus has to primarily turn to mitigation. How can such a situation
be mitigated against? Firstly, before this can be answered in any meaningful way, the
scenario needs to be described in greater detail.
In an attack, there are three types of actors: Public, Terrorists, and Responders. Public
are the actors that are being targeted and killed, and they receive information about
events either by witnessing it themselves, by conversing with one another and Respon-
ders, or perhaps by digital means (e.g. social media). Furthermore, it is assumed that
their behaviour follows the government guideline of “Run, Hide, Tell”. Terrorists on the
other hand, are the actors targeting the Public, and will receive information events by
witnessing it themselves, or talking to one another. Their behaviour is to main and kill as
many Public actors as possible until they are killed or apprehended themselves. Lastly,
Responders are policeofficers (on and off-duty), bouncers, independent members of the
public etc. who try to apprehend or kill the terrorists as fast as possible with the aim to
limit the loss of life of the Public. They gather information in the same way as Public
actors, as well as talking to Public actors themselves.
With these actors defined and a greater knowledge of their behaviours, then the initial
question about mitigation becomes: given the number of Public, Terrorists, and Respon-
ders, as well as the weapons of the Terrorists and the location of the attack, what is
the optimal strategy of a limited number of Responders that minimises total loss of life?
Furthermore, if the Public strategy of “Run, Hide, Tell” is no longer assumed, what are
the optimal strategies of the Public and Responders that minimises loss of life?
Before approaches are considered to model the scenario, everything that should ideally
be considered by any model is synthesized and summarised.
1.2 Knowledge synthesis
During the ESGI workshops, gathered knowledge was synthesized and visualized with
mind maps and issue trees.
1.2.1 Marauding terrorist attack
Figure 1 considers all of the constituent parts of a terrorist attack: the location, the type
of weapon, the type of target and the complexity of an attack. Furthermore, the location
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is characterised by its features, which may increase the likelihood of an attack there. See
Figure 2.
Figure 1: Mind map of marauding terrorist attack
1.2.2 Public knowledge
Figure 3 includes different examples of public information that influences their decision
making process, and their behaviour of “Run, Hide, Tell”. This excludes information
about responders. The public knowledge, and as well as public actors’ behaviour may
change after getting information about responders’ status e.g. responders’ location, num-
ber, and weaponry.
Except for public knowledge, it could prove important to incorporate the responders’
knowledge about attack. This information is likely to be helpful when modelling the
decision making of the responders.
1.2.3 Examples of data in to the model
Figure 4 includes different examples of information that can be used to:
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Figure 2: Mind map of features of attack place
Figure 3: Mind map of public knowledge
• Create a model of a panicked crowd’s movement
• Make decisions about the right response – for example the number of responders
and how they behave as groups and individually
• Check the influence of sharing information between the public and responders
3
Figure 4: Mind map of “data in” - model.
1.2.4 Examples of data out of the model
Figure 5 describes what information a model may be able to provide to best inform
responders and the public. The first branch considered is ’Information about possible
effects’ of different marauding terrorist attack types, as in Figure 1. The other branches
are ’Information about required response’ and ’Information to the public’. This could
inform future advice to prepare responders before and during a terrorist attack. Moreover,
it could lead to advice given to the public e.g. using social media.
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Figure 5: Mind map of “data out” - model.
2 Solution Approaches
2.1 Particle model
Presented in this chapter is a particle model to analyse the movement of civilians and
marauding terrorists in a two-dimensional domain such as a bridge, room, or city centre.
The model is based on the already broad amount of literature regarding crowd and herd
movement [1, 4, 7], including elements of panic [2, 5, 6]. The model consists of each public
actor α being modelled as separate particles with a position xα, a velocity vα, and an
acceleration aα. The positions and velocities of the public actors then evolve due to the
acceleration of the public actors which is governed using Newton’s second law of motion,
F = ma, where F is the force on the public actor, m is the mass, and a is the acceleration
of the public actor. The system of ODEs that governs the position and velocity is thus
dxα
dt
= vα, (1)
dvα
dt
=
1
mα
fα, (2)
where mα is the mass of public actor α (which herein is taken to be one for simplicity)
and fα is the force acting on public actor α. Lastly, as the public actors are physical
objects with a finite size, they are modelled as spheres with a radius rα.
The forces acting on each public actor are dependent on their surroundings and their
motives. The forces that are included in existing models in the literature depend heavily
on the situation that is being modelled. One force that is almost always necessary is
the repulsion of public actors from physical obstacles such as walls and pillars. There is
also usually a desired direction the public actors wish to go and therefore a force draws
them towards this point. In large crowds, another force that is often included is that
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individuals do not wish to be too close to other people, due to social limits. Lastly, there
is a tendency for individuals in crowds to tend to align their velocities with others that
are nearby, in a similar fashion to animals in herds. From this point, the rest of the
forces that one could include depend on the psychological model being used for public
actors in the particle model; the possible inclusions that could be added to these forces
are discussed in section 2.1.4.
For this example, forces describing the desire to be away from the terrorist, denoted as
f terroristα and towards any exits that are nearby, denoted by f
attract
α are included. Also
included are the repellent nature of physical obstacles and other public actors denoted
as f obstacleα and f
repel
α , respectively, and the herd-like mentality denoted as f
align
α . Lastly,
humans are not governed by these forces exactly and so there is some random noise
associated to the forces, denoted by ξ(t). Therefore, the force on public actor α, denoted
by fα, is expressed as a sum of all the forces and motives discussed, giving us
fα = f
terrorist
α + f
attract
α + f
obstacle
α + f
repel
α + f
align
α + ξ(t). (3)
2.1.1 Forces acting on public actors
The exact mathematical forms of all these forces are largely debatable, however, as they
are generally inversely related to the distance – something close to a public actor will
tend to affect their movement more than something at a great distance. The forms of
f obstacleα and f
repel
α used here are similar to those used in [4]. The obstacle force is felt
by public actor α relative to the closest obstacle point, xw, if the distance to that point,
dw = −‖xw−xα‖, is smaller than a chosen threshold distance. The force is described as
f obstacleα = −
[
f obstaclemax
1
1 + (dw/rα)p1
+ gobstaclemax exp
( −dw
σobstacle
)]
xw − xα
dw
, (4)
as the force felt by the public actor α from the closest point of the obstacle xw. The first
term in the brackets is taken from [4], which is mid-range and this represents the desire of
people to not be too close to walls, and the second term was added to have a very large,
very localised, force adjacent to the wall to represent a public actor’s inability to move
through walls. The maximum constants f obstaclemax and g
obstacle
max are the maximum values the
mid-range and short-range forces can take, respectively. The variables that govern how
quickly these forces decay as the public actor is further away from the obstacle are p1 for
the mid-range force and σobstacle for the short-range force. The coefficients are such that
gobstaclemax  f obstaclemax and in this case p1 = 2 in order to have relatively fast decay from the
obstacle, and σobstacle = 0.1 in order that the force be localised at the obstacle.
The repellent force is split into a near-range force, for when a public actor comes within
a short distance from public actor α, and a contact force for when a public actor comes
within rα of another public actor [7]. The force is described as
f repelα = −
∑
β 6=α
(
f repelmax
1
1 + ρp2α
s+ agrepelmax
1
1 + ρp3αβ
s
)
, (5)
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where s, ρα, ραβ, and a are given by
s =
xβ − xα
‖xβ − xα‖ , (6)
ρα =
‖xβ − xα‖
rα
, (7)
ραβ =
‖xβ − xα‖
rαrβ
, (8)
a = 1 if ραβ ≤ 1 and a = 2 if ραβ > 1. (9)
The near-range force in the left-hand side term in (5) while the contact force is the
right-hand side term.
In the case of a single terrorist and single exit, forces repelling public actors from the
terrorist and attracting the public actors to the exit are included in a similar way to
the obstacle force (with a long-range and a short-range force). Let xT and xexit denote
the locations of the terrorist and exit, respectively. Then dT = ‖xT − xα‖ denotes the
distance of public actor α from the terrorist and dexit = ‖xexit − xα‖, the distance of
public actor α from the exit. Then, the terrorist and exit forces are given by
f terroristα = −
[
f terroristmax exp
( −dT
σlongterrorist
)
+ gterroristmax exp
( −dT
σshortterrorist
)]
xT − xα
dT
, (10)
f attractα =
[
f attractmax exp
(−dexit
σlongattract
)
+ gattractmax exp
(−dexit
σshortattract
)]
xexit − xα
dexit
, (11)
where for both forces σshort  σlong. Here, σshort and σlong help determine the decay rate
of f and g.
Lastly, a flocking force [5] is used to model the force that causes the public actors to
prefer to move at a velocity similar to the velocities of the public actors nearby. The
force influencing public actor α to align their velocity with the public actors around them
is
f alignα =
∑
β 6=α
f alignmax
1 + ‖xα − xβ‖2
vβ
‖vβ‖ , (12)
where f alignmax is the aligning force parameter, which is usually smaller than other forces.
Of course, the public actors have only a finite speed and acceleration. Therefore, the
speed of every public actor is limited to vmax (around 8 ms
−1) but this could easily be
specific to each public actor instead. Thus, the normalised velocity of public actor α is
given by the following smoothed minimum function:
vα := − log [exp(−vmax) + exp(−‖vα‖)] vα‖vα‖ . (13)
The acceleration is also limited in a similar way, although people slow down much faster
than they speed up and so the acceleration is limited according to the dot product of
the acceleration with the velocity to distinguish between acceleration and deceleration.
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Let amax be the maximum acceleration magnitude if both acceleration aα and velocity
are in the same direction (around 5 ms−2). Let the maximum deceleration magnitude be
k×amax, i.e. if acceleration and velocity are in opposite direction. For all other directions,
the maximal acceleration magnitude Amax is given by
Amax = amax
(
k + 1
2
+
k − 1
2
aα · vα
‖aα‖‖vα‖
)
. (14)
As is done for the velocity, the acceleration is normalised using a smoothed minimum
function such as (13).
Heuristics are used to describe the strategies used by public actors when trying to avoid
multiple terrorists or choose between multiple exits. In the case of multiple terrorists,
closer terrorists must be considered as a higher threat. In the case of nT terrorists, the
total terrorist force is defined as a weighted sum of the individual forces
f terroristα,total =
1∑nT
i=1wi
nT∑
i=1
wif
terrorist
α,T i , (15)
with weights
wi =
1
‖xα − xT i‖2 , (16)
where xT i denotes the position of terrorist i and f
terrorist
α,T i , their repulsive force as defined
in (10).
In the case of multiple exits, public actors should be attracted towards the closest exit
that is not blocked by a terrorist. In the case of a single terrorist, public actor α considers
an exit to be blocked if the terrorist stands within a cone between the exit and the public
actor. If no exit is deemed safe, the public actor is attracted to the closest exit. In Figure
6, the right-hand side exit is not considered safe since it is within the cone. Indeed, the
public actor will choose the left-hand side exit even if it is further.
Figure 6: Illustration of the heuristic used to determine if an exit is safe. The left-hand
side exit is considered safe because the terrorist (red) is outside the cone between the
public actor (blue) and the exit. Similarly, the right-hand side exit is not considered safe.
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The angle of the cone is chosen to be 120◦. Hence, an exit is considered safe if
(xexit − xα) · (xT − xα)
‖xexit − xα)‖‖xT − xα‖ > 0.5 = cos(60
◦). (17)
In the case of multiple terrorists, using this heuristic for each terrorist often causes all
exits to be deemed unsafe. Instead of comparing the positions of the public actor and
exits with respect to individual terrorist, they are compared to a relative centre of the
terrorists. Instead of using the individual positions xT i in (17), a weighted centre of mass
of the form is used
xT =
1∑nT
i=1wi
nT∑
i=1
wixT i, (18)
where wi are defined by (16).
2.1.2 Terrorist Movement
The position xT and velocity vT are modelled using a similar particle model as that
described above. The position xT is governed by
dxT
dt
= vT , (19)
dvT
dt
=
1
mT
fT , (20)
where the mass of a terrorist is also set to mT = 1. The forces acting on the terrorist are
similar to those for the public actors but with a different desired direction of travel and
without the aligning force as the terrorist does not want to move with the crowd. The
force on the terrorist fT is given by
fT = f
obstacle
T + f
repel
T + f
closest
T . (21)
The force from the obstacles f obstacleT is exactly the same as for the public actors as the
obstacles interact exactly the same with terrorists as they do with public actors. The
terrorists do not want to be close to each other, therefore the short-range repellent force
f repelT influences the terrorists in the same way as the public actors.
The desired direction of the terrorists, described by f attractT , is more difficult to model
since one would need to know a priori the objective of the terrorists and the weapons
used in the attack. Several terrorist strategies (and therefore directions of travel) were
considered, but it is assumed here that the terrorists move towards the closest public actor
with a magnitude proportional to how far away they are. Let xclosest be the position of
the closest public actor to position xT , and dc = ‖xclosest − xT‖. Thus,
f closestT = f
terrorist
max exp
( −dc
σclosest
)
xT − xclosest
dc
, (22)
where σclosest is large enough that the force decays very slowly.
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The terrorist also needs to have finite speed and acceleration so these are limited, again
using (13) and (14). However, it is reasonable to think that the terrorists are more fit
than the average public actor. Therefore, it is assumed that a terrorist has a relatively
higher maximum speed and therefore vmax,T > vmax.
Assuming that if the terrorist comes within some distance dkill, the public actor dies,
becomes inactive and no forces are produced by the dead public actor. With a small
dkill, this models a knife or vehicle attack. In the case of firearms, the attractive force
would most likely have to consider more than simply the closest public actor, and a large
lethality radius around terrorists is likely to be an over-simplification.
2.1.3 Results
The model described in section 2.1 is implemented on MATLAB [8] using Euler’s method
[3] for time stepping the position and velocity of the public actors and the terrorist.
The topology used in the first experiment is a small square room with one exit and one
terrorist on the other side of the room with the starting positions of the ten public actors
randomly placed using a uniform distribution across the room. In Figure 7, the movement
of the different agents is illustrated over 5 seconds. One can observe how public actors
first head for the exit but move away from it when the terrorist’s repulsive force becomes
stronger than the attractive force of the exit. One can also see in the first 2 seconds, the
public actors in the upper part of the room have a positive y-velocity. Since the terrorist
started close to them, they initially run away from the terrorist instead of directly heading
towards the exit. This causes them to be trapped in the corner.
The second experiment takes place in a larger room with two exits, one terrorist in the
middle, and fifty public actors with uniformly distributed initial positions. In Figure 8,
one can observe how the public actors split in two groups heading for different exits.
When a terrorist blocks the left-hand side exit in the third second, the public actors start
heading for the other exit. Again, in the last frames, one can see a few public actors
returning to the left-hand side exit once a terrorist starts blocking the right-hand side
exit.
The third experiment take place in a square room with a single exit, three terrorists in
the middle, and fifty public actors with uniformly distributed initial positions. In Figure
9, one can observe how public actors do not head for the single exit when terrorists are
blocking it.
The last experiment takes place in a long domain representing a bridge for which either
side is considered an exit. As in previous experiments, there are three terrorists in the
middle and fifty public actors with uniformly distributed initial positions. In Figure 10,
one can observe how much easier it is for the public actors to escape when exits are so
wide. Indeed, there is absolutely no clogging at the exits.
10
Figure 7: Simulation in a 15m× 15m room with 1 exit, 10 public actors and 1 terrorist.
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Time t = 0s. Casualties = 0
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Time t = 1s. Casualties = 1
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Time t = 2s. Casualties = 1
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Time t = 3s. Casualties = 1
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Time t = 4s. Casualties = 1
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Time t = 5s. Casualties = 1
2.1.4 Future work
From these simulation results, one can see that these particle and crowd models illustrate
one way that people could move in a crowded room and when trying to escape a moving
threat. The results of the simulations can be very different depending on which parame-
ters are used in the forces - for example, each fmax, gmax, σ, p, ρ, and the random noise ζ.
This means that the model needs to be somewhat calibrated to fit the heuristics people
have about crowd movement from experience (i.e. model parameter settings should be
informed by behavioural experts). Additionally, it was observed that the parameters are
somewhat dependent on the geometry of the situation, which is undesirable. An early
adjustment to the model would be to find other expressions for the forces which make the
results independent from the geometry, or understand how they depend on the geometry
and include this into the expressions.
Despite the calibrating of the parameters in the model being both tedious and relying
heavily on heuristic knowledge, it can be helpful as one can use the changes in the
parameters to predict what happens when the behaviour of the public actors changes.
Using the average number of casualties from several simulations using these parameters,
changing the actors’ starting positions in each simulation, one could potentially advise
public actors about what to do in these situations to minimise public actor casualties. For
example, if by varying f terroristmax and f
attract
max and measuring the average number of casualties
from several simulations, one can advise the public actors how much to prioritise heading
11
Figure 8: Simulation in a 30m× 20m room with 2 exits, 50 public actors and 1 terrorist.
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Figure 9: Simulation in a 20m× 20m room with 1 exit, 50 public actors and 3 terrorists.
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Figure 10: Simulation on a 80m× 10m bridge with 50 public actors and 3 terrorists.
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for an exit over immediately getting as far away from the terrorist as possible.
While the current model does include important phenomena found in crowd models
[1, 4, 7] and herd models [5], there are many other features that could be included. This is
largely due to the fact that these preexisting models are for much simpler situations than
that being considered here. Indeed, crowd models do not account for strong non-local
repulsive forces and prey-predator models do not include obstacles and exits. The strate-
gies of the different actors in a marauding terrorist model are much more complex. The
discussions about what to include and how are not necessarily a mathematical question
but more down to psychological modelling. Further behaviours could be included mathe-
matically into the model using similar force terms as presented in section 2.1 depending
on what is driving the force and where from. Examples of further considerations to the
model include how a public actor makes a decision when there are multiple threats, if
there is a chance the public actor is unhurt by the terrorist, if they attempt to attack the
terrorist and if they choose to hide. As discussed above, this last inclusion could then be
used to vary the parameters in the model and quantify how useful the “Run, Hide, Tell”
advice currently given to public actors caught in a terrorist attack.
In conclusion, the work carried out on the particle model was to demonstrate how this
could be achieved, and to highlight the huge amount of literature available on the subject
of crowd movement and panic modelling. The particle-based model presented here can be
adapted and extended to be as sophisticated as is deemed necessary and can be applied to
many situations and geometries of locations. This could be used as a way of calibrating
the model in a more rigorous fashion by using data and evidence from previous attacks
to ensure the model is realistic in a terrorist attack.
2.2 Discrete time network model
2.2.1 Principles and algorithm outline
The progress of a marauding terrorist attack is modeled in discrete time steps (which for
brevity we shall call turns)
The spatial domain represented as a graph. The vertices of the graph represent physical
locations, and two locations share an edge if actors (civilians, terrorists, responders, etc.)
can travel between them in one turn. See Figure 11.
A key feature of this model, which distinguishes it from existing work on panicking crowd
and predator-prey models that we found in an initial literature survey, is that individuals
(and populations) behave according to information that spreads between populations in a
node and also remotely (via phone calls to authorities, responder radio communications,
social media). Actors keep a record (either individually or as populations) of locations
(nodes) and times when other actors have been seen or heard, and may exchange this
information via various mechanisms with allies. The behaviour of an individual or po-
pulation is determined by the information available to them, their environment, and a
pre-defined strategy.
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Figure 11: Representing a shopping centre as a network.
Note that to simplify the implementation non-integer numbers of public actors (i.e. civi-
lians) is allowed in the code provided. This simplification is referred to as the continuum
model. To enforce only integer populations, a probabilistic approach may be required to
determine the motion of the actors. An example of such a probabilistic model is given in
section 2.3.
A turn involves the following key steps, only some of which have been implemented in
this model:
1. All actors evaluate neighbouring nodes, based on the information available to them,
the intrinsic values of the locations, and a strategy. Using these evaluations and
specified decision rules, each able actor may move to a neighbouring node or stay
at the node they currently occupy. Note in the continuum case, replace ’each’ with
’a proportion of”.
2. In addition to movements, during a turn we may observe the following actions:
• Terrorists inflict casualties to those within a node, or possibly in neighbouring
nodes, depending on the scale and weapon.
• Unaware civilians become alerted, for example if they share a node with other
alerted civilians or responders, or by receiving social media messages.
• Alerted civilians go into hiding if there is space in the node.
• Hiding civilians send information to the authorities or to social media.
• Hiding civilians become “runners” again, depending on nearby threats and
responders.
• Alerted or hiding civilians become responders.
• Responders apprehend/damage terrorists in the same or neighbouring nodes.
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3. Terrorists generate sightings that alert nearby civilians and responders, who then
add to their information.
4. Responders generate sightings that nearby attackers and civilians add to their in-
formation.
5. Civilians generate sightings that nearby terrorists and reponders add to their infor-
mation.
2.2.2 Remark on space/time scales
The model described here is based on the assumption that nodes of the graph represent
locations that can be traversed by an actor in one time step. If this leads to an unrealistic
model of the location, or infeasible computation, we suggest the following:
• To represent smaller spaces (finer resolution) use a smaller time step, or allow actors
to traverse more than one edge per step. Either will most likely be computationally
expensive to simulate a given time in the real world
• To represent larger spaces (lower resolution) take a larger time step, or do not
allow actors to move every turn. With the simplification of modeling civilians
as a continuum or probability distribution, this can also be achieved by having a
greater fraction staying at its current node. For example, if pst is the fraction of
the (surviving) population that occupy node N at time s and ‘intend’ to move to
neighbouring node M at time t, motion at 1/2 a node per turn could be modeled
by taking
qt = p
t−2
t + p
t−1
t /2
pt−1t+1 = p
t−1
t /2− dt,
(23)
where qt is the population that makes this move, and dt depends on casualties taken
at N at time t, for example
• An alternative method to allow for differing rates of travel would be to introduce
extra edges and nodes within our graph. The proportion of actors making a step in
the new graph which previously corresponded to two steps in the old graph would be
very small. This would represent a particularly fast actor. Similarly, the proportion
of actors that move less than what corresponds to one step in the old graph would
be very small. This would represent a particularly slow actor.
2.2.3 Mathematical description: a simple “danger” function
As previously described, the geometry of the location is represented by a directed graph
with the sets of vertices, and edges denoted by V and E respectively.
Before giving a detailed mathematical framework it is useful to consider the following
example, that demonstrates how a population of public actors at a certain node might
behave. The purpose of this example is to provide intuition for the formal system put
forward afterwards. It should not be interpreted as a final model.
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Fix a vertex vi, to all vertices vj adjacent to vi, the following quantity is associated:
Danger at vj =
5∑
n=0
number of terrorists observed at vj n turns ago
n
. (24)
Note that a greater number of terrorists at node vj increases the perceived danger, and
that older observations are given less weight, in fact those older than 5 turns are ignored.
Let vj∗ be the vertex adjacent to vi for which this number is minimised. In other words,
vj∗ has the least danger among all neighbours of vi, this turn.
Then the system could evolve via the simple rule: “all alert public actors at vi move to
vj∗”.
2.2.4 Mathematical description: general model
The mathematical model is now put forward in a rigorous manner. Any edge e ∈ E is
assigned a length Le. For a vertex v, αv, βv denote the population capacity and number
of available hiding spaces in v, respectively. Other properties could also be added, such
as modifiers for damage or visibility for actors in the node.
Different edge sets could be defined for different groups of actors. For example some edges
may be available for actors on foot, that cannot be traversed by actors using a vehicle.
The number of turns elapsed (time) is denoted by t. For each t, denote the population
in vertex vi ∈ V by
P ti = (U
t
i , A
t
i, H
t
i , R
t
i, T
t
i )
>.
The components U ti , A
t
i, H
t
i , R
t
i, T
t
i represent the numbers of un-alert public, alert public
(“runners”), hiding public, responders and terrorists, respectively.
For each of these sub-populations Ati, . . . , T
t
i except un-alerted public, there is a corre-
sponding information set, IA,i,t, . . . , IT,i,t, consisting of a set of (“memories”), that those
actors hold.
Each of these memories has the form
(t0, i, nu, na, nh, nr, nt) (25)
where t0 is the observation time, i is the observed vertex, and nu, na, nh, nr, nt denote the
populations at the place and time corresponding to the populations in P ti (as “observed”
– which may be different from P ti ).
The system evolution is then described as follows, for each i:
1. Calculate the population in vi remaining there for the next turn:
Qti =
P ti − ∑
(i,j)∈E
X tijP
t
i
 , (26)
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Figure 12: Movement of public actors and their information
where the (diagonal) exchange matrices
X tij = X
t
ij(αvi , βvi , {P tk}(i,k)∈E, P ti , IA,i,t, . . . , IT,i,t) (27)
represent the fractions of populations moving from node vi to node vj at time t.
2. Re-distribute a proportion of roles amongst those remaining (e.g. unaware→run→hide,
etc.), and add actors moving into vi to the appropriate population:
P˜ t+1i = M
t
iQ
t
i +
∑
(j,i)∈E
X tjiP
t
j , (28)
where M ti = M
t
i (α, β, {P t+1j }(j,i)∈E, IA,i,t, . . . , IT,i,t) is a matrix, with each row sum-
ming to 1, that represents the re-distribution of roles (unaware, hiding, running,
etc.) among the populations remaining in the node. See figure 12.
3. Calculate casualties, and apprehended terrorists etc. Subtract these losses from the
corresponding populations:
P t+1i = P˜
t+1
i −Dt+1i . (29)
The casualty rate is Dti = (αvi , βvi , {P˜ t+1k }(k,i)∈E, P˜ t+1i ).
4. Transport information with the movement of population:
I˜Y,i,t = GY
({(IY,j,t, X tjiP tj , ) : (j, i) ∈ E},M ti , Qti, IA,i,t, . . . , IT,i,t) , (30)
where Y = A,H,R, T . The function GY should be designed to model the transmis-
sion of information between actors in the same vertex.
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5. Generate new information for non-terrorists from observations and non-local means
(i.e. social media, news, responder radio etc.). Merge these with current informa-
tion:
IY,i,t+1 = F
i
Y (I˜A,i,t, I˜H,i,t, I˜R,i,t, {P t+1j }(j,i)∈E) ∪N t+1Y for Y = A,H,R. (31)
where N t+1Y T represents the new information given to actors in Y . The function
F iY should be designed to model actors observing events and populations at vi and
nearby vertices.
6. Information held by the terrorists is created and merged in the same way, but
information is not shared between this group and the non-terrorists:
IT,i,t+1 = F
i
T (I˜T,i,t, {P t+1j }(j,i)∈E) ∪N t+1T . (32)
where N t+1T represents the new information held by the terrorists.
The details of the model are then implemented by choosing appropriate functions M ti ,
X tij, D
t
i , GY , F
i
Y , and N
t
Y for (Y = A,H,R, T ).
In the sample code provided, certain simple choices for these functions have been made.
Note that for reasons of computational efficiency and design consideration the script does
not explicitly define these functions.
2.2.5 Possible features to add
(2.1) The following features are not currently implemented in the sample code, but are
potentially useful additions:
• Add different tactics and weapons for terrorists and responders. In particular there
should be specific damage models and actor logic in the cases of knife, gun and
vehicle attacks.
• Limit accessability of certain nodes to certain groups e.g attackers in cars.
• Assign intrinsic values to nodes for each type of actors
• Model responders sharing information via comms/radio
• Model information going to the public (social media) non-locally
• Model police radio to businesses/public information announcements or displays, as
non-local means to alert/instruct the public. Similarly television and radio announ-
cements could be modeled
• Add a model of the decision making/ information aggregation by the authorities.
For example prioritising responses, analysing the effect of delays etc.
• Add the chance for civilians become responders. (May be unsuited to the continuum
model.)
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Figure 13: Representing multiple floors is straightforward using the network approach
• The current implementation uses a simplified method for calculating the distance
between nodes. This only takes account of the physical distance between locations,
rather than the length of possible routes between them, which depend on the lengths
of the edges. Without the correct distance metric, actors will make unrealistic
moves.
• Using a more appropriate metric (see previous remark) would allow for a wider
variety of floor plans to be modeled. For example, it would be useful to be able to
model buildings with multiple floors. See Figure 13.
• Allow some nodes to be designated ’safe’ (exit nodes). See Figure 11.
• Introduce new states for actors, e.g. captured, injured.
• The model described above allows only for observations to nodes that are connected
by an edge, i.e. locations that can be moved between within one turn. To allow for
a more realistic model of observations, each node could be allocated a list of nodes
that it can observe.
2.2.6 Potential outcomes
This model allows the simulation of an unfolding attack by a marauding terrorist. It
predicts the number of people that are alive at a certain time, and the action they are
currently undertaking. Importantly, modifying the functions M ti , X
t
ij, D
t
i , GY , F
i
Y , and
N tY for (Y = A,H,R, T ), and running multiple simulations allows some conclusions to
be drawn in response to the following questions:
• Which strategies for the general public are more effective, i.e. run, hide/tell, fight,
etc.?
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Figure 14: Output of sample code. Legend: Unalert public, Alert public, Hiding public,
Terrorist(s), Responder(s)
(a) t = 0: Attack begins (b) t = 3: Public begin to run
(c) t = 11: Alarm spreads, some hide and
call the police
(d) t = 38: A responder has arrived and
apprehended two terrorists
• What influence will social media and public broadcasts have on how an event un-
folds?
• Which types of layout make a location particularly vulnerable?
• What is an optimal response by the police? That is, how many responders should
they send in?
Figure 14 comprises several images generated by an initial implementation of the model.
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2.3 Game simulation model
In this section, individual strategies are monitored for each of the three groups of actors
(Public, Terrorist and Responders) as states of their situation. By formulating the pro-
bability of changing state for each group, the expected number of people in each state
can be generated at each point in time. This approach describes the state of person as a
stochastic process, and uses discrete-time Markov chains [9]. At every point in time, an
actor’s state will change with given probabilities.
2.3.1 Public
A definition of a public actor’s situation as stochastic process XP with states is as follows:
XP = UA, R, H, T, S, DP
UA – Unaware (a person that does not know about the attack) – once they have left
this state, they cannot revert to it at any point
R – Run (this could be divided into R1, R2, R3, R4 – four directions to run)
H – Hide (means just staying in the same safe for now place without information ex-
change)
T – Tell (situation when the person is able to pass the information about the situation
to other people, responders etc.)
S – Safe (state when the person is completely safe, away from the threat) - upon entering
this state, they do not change
DP – Dead (the person has been killed) - as above, upon entering this state, they do
not change
Figure 15: The transition matrix – matrix of probabilities of changing state from i to j
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Where the probabilities [ppij] of Public actors changing from state i to state j are conditi-
onal on:
• Type of location where attack is happening (open territory or a building)
• Weapon(s) of the terrorist
• Number and location of public around
• Number and location of the terrorist(s)
• Distance from the exit/safe place
• Number and location of the responders
The probability of each state depends only on the last state the person was in, which
mathematically is: P (Xp,n = xp,n|Xp,n−1 = xp,n−1). hence the chain has the Markov
property [9].
2.3.2 Terrorist
A definition of the terrorist’s situation as stochastic process XT with states is as follows:
XT = K, F, E, D
K – Kill (the terrorist stays in the place, where they can reach and kill their victims)
F – Follow (the terrorist is following people and trying to find victims. This could be
divided into F1, F2, F3, F4 – four directions to follow the victims)
E – Escape (the terrorist is looking for the way out without killing people. This could
be divided into E1, E2, E3, E4 – four directions to move)
DT Dead (the terrorist has been killed) - upon entering this state, the terrorist does not
change
Where the probabilities [ptij] of the terrorist changing from state i to state j are conditional
on:
• Type of location where the attack is happening (open territory or a building)
• Weapon(s) of the terrorist
• Number and location of public around
• Number and location of the responders
• Weapon(s) of the responders
• Escape route/location
The probability of each state depends only on the last state the person was in, which
mathematically is: P (Xt,n = xt,n|Xt,n−1 = xt,n−1). Hence this chain also has the Markov
property[9].
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Figure 16: The transition matrix – matrix of probabilities of changing state from i to j
2.3.3 Responders
A definition of the responders’ situation as stochastic process XP with states is as follows:
XR = P, C, G, A, DR
P Protect (responders stays in the place to protect public there)
C Chasing the terrorist (responders are looking for the terrorist, it could be divided into
C1, C2, C3, C4 – four directions to chase)
G Go out (responders are going out of the attack scene with some people from public –
rescuing them, it could be divided into G1, G2, G3, G4 – four directions to move)
A Assassinate (responders assassinate the terrorist)
DR Dead (the responder has been killed) - upon entering this state, they do not change
Where the probabilities [prij] of the responders changing from state i to state j are con-
ditional on: type of location where attack is happening (open territory or a building),
weapon of the terrorist,
• Type of location where attack is happening (open territory or a building),
• Weapon(s) of the terrorist(s)
• Weapon(s) of the responders
• Number and location of public around
• Number and location of other responders
• Number and location of the terrorist(s)
• Escape route/location.
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Figure 17: The transition matrix – matrix of probabilities of changing state from i to j
The probability of each state depends only on the last state the person was in, which
mathematically is: P (Xr,n = xr,n|Xr,n−1 = xr,n−1). Hence, as expected, this chain has
Markov property as well [9].
2.3.4 Estimation of probabilities
The probabilities for each actor cannot easily to be calculated directly, however they
could be estimated based on: some heuristics (e.g. herd mentality), data from previous
terrorist attacks, surveys (or other types of crowd-sourcing methods), and simulations.
2.3.5 Possible outcome from the model
Having the initial probabilities and the initial number of actors in each state would enable
a model to compute all actors’ behaviour over time.
The most important goal is to minimize (or at least estimate) the number of public being
killed during the terrorist attack. With the initial number of public actors in the place
of attack and probabilities [ppij], it is possible to compute the expected number of killed
public actors at each time step. Let tn describe the time steps, where n = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
and E#DP ](tn) - expected number of killed public actors at tn. Let E#i(tn) describe
the number of public actors in state i at time tn and [p
p
ij] is the probability of changing
the state from i to j.
E#DP (t0) = 0 for n = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . and E#DP (tn) =
∑
i=1
E#iP (tn−1)pPiD+E#DP (tn−1)
(33)
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Figure 18: Simulation
Furthermore, the probabilities of the public and responders could be connected in some
way to maximize the number of Safe and minimize the number of Dead. Armed with
that information, the recommended strategy for responders (maybe also for the public)
could be understood.
3 Conclusion
Whilst the report above demonstrates three not-yet-complete models of a ’maruading
terrorist’, these approaches clearly mark paths of research and areas for further develop-
ment that could prove helpful indeed when considering what could constitute an ’optimal
strategy’ by Responders and Public alike in such a situation. Even if only one model is ta-
ken forward, extending it could help researchers and policy-makers better understand the
dynamics of scenarios as they unfold, and how minor tweaks in strategy and tactics can
have a substantial impact on the rest of the scenario, and the number of killed members
of the public. Whatever happens next, due to recent societal and political observations
across the world, it is likely that there will be more ’marauding terrorist’ attacks to come,
and the hope is that studies like this one will continue to help in whatever way they can
to ultimately preserve human life.
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A Appendices
A.1 Network Model Code Readme
*******************************************
Implementation of discrete-time
network model for CAST problem
Produced at ESGI 130 by Ben Pooley
Version 0.1
*******************************************
##Script: S c r i p t ( . py ) f i l e s are compatible with Python 3 . 5 . 2
##Required Libraries: sc ipy , networkx and matp lo t l i b ( Al l
inc luded in Anaconda 4 . 2 . 0 )
##File descriptions:
NetworkMain1.py Sample implementation . Generate a
sequence o f image f i l e s i l l u s t r a t i n g the model ( as
implemented in Networks1 . py ) in the case o f a s i n g l e attacker
, with map and i n i t i a l c i v i l i a n populat ion s p e c i f i e d in Grid2
. grd
NetworkMain2.py In t h i s example we use the c l a s s e s in
Networks1 . py to run a s imu la t i on on a r e c t angu l a r gr id , with
a modi f i ed model parameters .
Networks1.py Implements primary c l a s s e s to i n s t a n t i a t e
the model ( both the s t y l e and f u n c t i o n a l i t y need s i g n i f i c a n t
re f inement −− t h i s should be cons ide r ed proof−of−concept ) N.B
. Seve ra l important parameters f o r the behaviour o f the model
are s p e c i f i e d throughout t h i s f i l e . In p a r t i c u l a r s ee ”
u s e f u l s t a t i c parameters ” ( p r e f i x e d ” s ”) at the s t a r t o f
c l a s s d e f i n i t i o n s
Key c l a s s e s s p e c i f i e d :
Group base Tracks a c i v i l i a n populat ion and
i t s knowledge
Node base Represents a node in the
geometry . Respons ib le f o r managing c i v i l i a n
groups , responders , and a t t a c k e r s at that
l o c a t i o n Key methods : Update1 ,
UpdateTerror ist1 , UpdateResponders1
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T e r r o r i s t De f ine s a t ta cke r behaviour
(mostly supplementary to Node base .
UpdateTerror i s t1 )
Responder De f ine s responder behaviour (
mostly supplementary to Node base .
UpdateResponders1 )
Network Top−l e v e l c l a s s . Respons ib le f o r
: i n i t i a l i s i n g the geometry ( nodes ) e.g. by
par s ing a . grd f i l e , c a l l i n g Node base update
methods f o r each time step , r ender ing to a
pyplot p l o t v ia networkx , d i s t r i b u t i n g
in fo rmat ion about a t tacke r s i g h t i n g s between
nodes , and (currently) mainta in ing the
a u t h o r i t i e s ’ knowledge base ( which a f f e c t s
responder behaviour )
ParseBMP.py U t i l i t y s c r i p t . Converts a c o l l e c t i o n o f
bitmaps ( o f the same dimensions ) to a . grd f i l e . Current ly
the re i s no i n t e r f a c e − in /out f i l e paths are g l o b a l
cons tant s in ParseBMP . py .
Grid2.grd A pla in−t ex t f i l e format d e f i n i n g network
geometry ( node l o c a t i o n s and connect ions ) as we l l as
p r o p e r t i e s o f nodes such as : I n i t i a l populat ion , maximum node
populat ions , and number o f h id ing spaces in each node .
Map.bmp Input to ParseBMP . py . De f ine s gr id−based
network layout . Non−zero RGB va lues correspond to nodes .
Adjacent ( non−d iagona l ) nodes w i l l be connected (except on l a s t
row/column , due to quick coding ! ) . N.B. A gr id based layout
( as produced by ParseBMP . py ) i s not assumed in the model ,
nor in the ∗ . grd s p e c i f i c a t i o n . For example , i t may be
appropr ia t e to r ep r e s e n t a c o r r i d o r as a s i n g l e node , with
many connected room nodes , whereas with the ParseBMP approach
, each node has degree at most 4 .
Map CAP.bmp Input to ParseBMP . py . Assumed same
dimensions as Map.bmp. RGB i n t e n s i t y ( at p i x e l s cor re spond ing
to nodes in Map.bmp) r e p r e s e n t s c i v i l i a n capac i ty o f the
node .
Map HID.bmp Input to ParseBMP . py . Assumed same
dimensions as Map.bmp. RGB i n t e n s i t y ( at p i x e l s cor re spond ing
to nodes in Map.bmp) r e p r e s e n t s number o f h id ing p l a c e s in
the node .
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Map POP.bmp Input to ParseBMP . py . Assumed same
dimensions as Map.bmp. RGB i n t e n s i t y ( at p i x e l s cor re spond ing
to nodes in Map.bmp) r e p r e s e n t s i n i t i a l populat ion o f (un−
a l e r t e d ) c i v i l i a n s in the node .
##Instructions to run sample NetworkMain1.py or NetworkMain2.py
Open and run the f i l e in Spyder ( supp l i ed with Anaconda 4 . 2 . 0 ) ,
or run from the command l i n e with ”python NetworkMain1 . py” or
”python NetworkMain2 . py” ( assuming PATH v a r i a b l e s con f i gu r ed
c o r r e c t l y , i f us ing Windows)
Note : t h i s should produce a number o f image f i l e s in the working
d i r e c t o r y
##Instructions to use ParseBMP.py
Ensure that the four bitmaps Map∗ .bmp are in the working
d i r e c t o r y ( backup Grid2 . grd i f r equ i r ed ) and run ParseBMP.py
as de s c r ibed above ( us ing Spyder or ”python
ParseBMP.py” on the command l i n e ) .
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Figure 19: The phase space for the dynamical system, with the variables x and y, and
an initial condition indicated as a blue dot.
x
y
initial condition
A.2 A Continuous Dynamical Systems Model
Below is a simple relation illustrated between some fundamental elements of a generic
incident. The dynamical system is a simple example of the dynamics of two competing
species in its simplest nonlinear form.
We consider 2 time-dependent variables, x and y, which are both real-valued and positive.
The value of x expresses both the number of terrorists and the quality of the situation
as seen from the viewpoint of the terrorists, and the value of y measures the the number
of victims and the quality of the situation as seen from the viewpoint of the victims.
In such a competitive species evolution, there is no stable equilibrium; the final outcome,
t → +∞, sometimes called the ω-limit, will contain a finite value for only one of the
dependent variables; the other variable is zero.
As initial condition (x(0), y(0)) in an terrorist-victim scenario, both x and y have small,
positive values. This is illustrated as the blue dot in figure 19.
The model of the evolution of the variables has the form
dx(t)
dt
= ax(t)− bx(t)2 − cx(t)y(t) (34)
dy(t)
dt
= dy(t)− ey(t)2 − fy(t)x(t)
The six (positive, real) parameters a, b, c, d, e, and f have the following interpretations:
• The parameter a is an indicator of the initial enthusiasm of the aggressors, as it
causes the quality of the situation from their viewpoint, to improve.
• The parameter b is a measure of the strength of the ability of the responders to
neutralise the terrorists. It is proportional to x2 as it is expected to grow strongly
with the number of terrorists.
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Figure 20: The evolution of the initial condition in phase space depends on the location
of the basins of attraction for the dynamical system. If the location of the unstable
equilibria and the separatrices are such that the initial condition falls within the lower
basin of attraction B1, the terrorists ‘win’ in the sense that the end state contains a finite
value of x and 0 of y.
x
y
initial condition
stable  point
stable  point
unstable  point
B1
B2
• The parameter c measures the negative impact on x of the presence of y, this is
the ability of the victims (as opposed to the police responders) to neutralize the
terrorists in confrontations. It will be zero if the victims only flee and hide.
• The parameter d is an indicator of the initial mobility (the ability to flee) of the
victims.
• The parameter e is a measure of how bad the ‘clogging’ or ‘jamming’ effect is, in
the situation at hand. Tight spaces, walls, enclosures or other hindrances to free
flight, will add to the magnitude of e, and the term is proportional to y2.
• The parameter f measures the negative impact on y of the presence of x, in other
words, this is how effective the aggressors are in encounters. It is proportional to
the frequency xy of encounters between species x and y.
• The structure of the phase phase flow depends on the location of the stationary
points and the interlacing seperatrices that partition basins of attraction. See figure
20.
If the values of the parameters a− f are such that the initial condition lies in the basin
of attraction to the stable equilibrium point with a nonzero x-value, it is only a question
of time before the value of y is zero, and the terrorists have achieved their goal. This is
illustrated in figure 20.
On the other hand, if the parameters a−f , in particular the parameter b, which measures
the effectiveness of the response, and to a minor extent the parameter c, which measures
negative impact on the terrorist variable x of encounters with y, have values to shape the
phase space flow such that the initial point is in the basin B2, then the evolution ends
up with a finite number for the y-variable and 0 for the x-variable.
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Figure 21: The phase space for the dynamical system, with the same initial situation, but
now the parameters b and c favor the victims. The values force the unstable stationary
point and the associated separatrices to make the initial point part of the basin B2 of
attraction to the stable equilibrium containing a finite value for y and a 0 value for x.
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y
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